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This paper deals with the phenomenon of Complacency which is one of the causes of human error 
detected in the domain of ship accidents. The term Complacency is present as an influential social and 
psychological factor which has similar cause in shipping and port commercial operations. The causes of 
ship accidents from the aspect of Complacency are defined as Management Complacency, Leadership 
Complacency and Self-Induced Complacency. All of these causes are reflected as causes of accidents in 
ports at the management and operational level. The main domain in which Complacency is present as 
influential element is decision-making process as well as in ship and port commercial operations. 
 






Commercial and economic demands between different areas and continents are 
mostly satisfied by maritime transport. (Economic and Social Committee of the 
European Communities, 1986; Ross, 1998) This gives rise to mutual connections and 
conditionality of technological and organisational components between ships as 
transporting vehicles on one hand, and ports as start and finish in the maritime transport 
on the other. Besides, it is important to keep in mind that ports should be considered as 
one of the most vital aspects of a national transport infrastructure. For most trading 
nations they are the main transport link with their trading partners and thus a focal point 
for motorways and railway systems. At the same time they are major economic 
multiplier for the nation's prosperity as well as commercial infrastructure in the form of 
banks, agencies and industrial activity. Ports should also be considered as one of the 
most important aspects of maritime transport because they are the location where most 
maritime accidents happen usually in shallow water, where ships converge. Accidents in 
the vicinity of ports and terminals often cause disastrous ecological consequences (e.g. 
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Exxon Valdez, United States. Congress. Senate. National Ocean Policy Study. and 
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation. 
Subcommittee on Merchant Marine, 1989) and numerous human victims (e.g. Herald of 
Free Enterprise). Besides, this is the place where most costs are incurred because much 
of the extra cost and delay occurs in ports (International Labour Office and International 
Maritime Organization, 2004). 
 
 
2. Managing safety at sea – Present status and tendencies 
 
Safety at sea in the conditions of modern maritime transport assumes an increasingly 
significant place in the process of transport by sea. Standards of maritime safety, among 
other things, are considered and adopted by the International Maritime Organisation – 
IMO as a specialized institution of the United Nations.(International Maritime 
Organization. 1990) The standards related to maritime safety, successfulness of 
navigation as well as prevention and supervision of oil pollution from ships are 
proposed by 158 IMO member countries. Furthermore, IMO makes efforts to establish 
collaboration among Governments as for all kinds of technical matters related to 
maritime affairs in international commerce. IMO consists of the Assembly, Council, 
Secretary and five Committees: Maritime Safety Committee, Marine Environment 
Protection Committee, Legal Committee, Technical Cooperation Committee and 
Facilitation Committee. Maritime Safety Committee – MSC – is competent for the area 
of maritime safety. Among other issues in this domain it deals with maritime accidents, 
i.e. any subject having direct influence on the safety of navigation. The work of the 
IMO consists of reaching decisions some of which, the most important ones, are 
compiled into international conventions. Such conventions are mandatory for all the 
IMO member countries. In the future IMO is not expected to issue new conventions but 
to apply the enacted documents and to  
To date international conventions which are important for the safety at sea are: 
• Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea – SOLAS, 1974; 
• Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 
COLREGS 1972; 
• International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships – MARPOL 
1978; 
• International Convention on Load Lines, LOADLINE 1966; 
• International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, TONNAGE 1969; 
• International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, SAR 1978. 
The above mentioned Conventions contribute to the safety at sea as well as to 
environment protection. What is characteristic and common to all the Conventions is the 
reason for their compilation and adoption. Namely, each Convention is based on a 
previous maritime accident whose causes were found out and whose consequences were 
significant to the extent of initiating the formulation and adoption of regulations and 
decisions, i.e. conventions. For instance, SOLAS Convention was issued at the 1914 
session instigated by the British Government on the occasion of sinking of Titanic in 
1912. Then, on the occasion of sinking of RO-RO passenger ship Herald of Free 
Enterprise in 1987 Chapter II – I, regulations 23-2 and 42-1 of SOLAS Convention 
were supplemented in 1988. Next, there came MARPOL Convention that was preceded 
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by the grounding of the tanker Torrey Canyon in 1967. Generally speaking, the 
significance of an accident as for making regulations that in future should act 
preventively is not characteristic of IMO only but can also be applied to single countries 
which on the occasion of accidents in their territorial waters enacted internal laws on 
future prevention. Such an example are the USA which after the grounding of the tanker 
Exxon Valdez in Alaska in 1989 brought in 1990 the Oil Pollution Act – OPA. What is 
more, this Act imposed more rigorous standards on the building of tankers than 
MARPOL Convention. 
However, such an approach to preventing further accidents with similar or identical 
causes has not proved efficient. In that sense, a need was felt for further insight into 
causes of maritime accidents on the basis of which shared basic cause–effect 
relationships would be found out.(Reason 1999) Results of investigations have focused 
on unsatisfactory efficiency of shipping companies with regard to the safety of work on 
board and environment protection during exploitation of ships. An accent was put on the 
effect of incorrectly defined or even non-existent working procedures in ordinary 
circumstances and emergencies. The result was issuing of International Safety 
Management Code – ISM that along with the introduction of ISO Standards on board 
and in the companies was supposed to eliminate the spotted incompatibilities. The Code 
was reinforced in the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watch-keeping – STCW in 1995 which has obliged all the member countries, 
shipping companies and seamen training institutions. As it became evident from later 
accidents, neither the ISM Code nor the introduction of ISO Standards were not enough 
to remove the possibility of the occurrence of accidents. This can be proved by the 
collision of ships Norwegian Dream and Ever Decent in 1999. Both ships complied with 
all the regulations of the SOLAS Convention and ISM Code but still they collided in 
conditions of good visibility and calm sea. (International Maritime Organization. 2004) 
It was this accident that emphasized the formerly noticed but not enough accentuated 
and investigated elements of human error. Namely, it was to be admitted that auditors of 
effectiveness of the ISM Code and ISO Standards implementation except for efficient 
examination of ship procedures could not cover the area of personal experience or 
influence communication, organisation, sociological and psychological relations within 
and between different cultural groups on board. It has been noticed that each of the 
above mentioned areas could initially set in motion a chain of errors made by 
crewmembers that finally brings to an accident. In that sense, we are dealing with 
human error due to fatigue and tiredness, inappropriate communication, unsuitable 
equipment handling technology as well as other kinds of influences among which the 
most significant are influences of the shipping company to ship organisation and 
influence of ship management style. 
 
 
3. Complacency – Basic concept and operational influences 
 
A recent approach to the analysis of maritime accidents accentuates some basic 
prerequisites for the occurrence of human error in the form of spotted lack of free 
communication and cooperation not only within ship organisation but also in its relation 
to external factors, especially shipping companies. It is the inappropriate 
communication along with deficient cooperation both on board and in the relation of 
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ship to external factors that represents one of the basic causes of reaching improper 
decisions and taking inefficient actions. (Maxwell 1976; Curtis 1991; Fukuda 1992; 
Emmott 2003) 
The genesis of inappropriate communication and poor cooperation follows both from 
the model of ship organisation and management style as well as from special and 
complementary socio-psychological influences. Such influences are witnessed on board 
and have direct influence on the quality of management.(Fahlgen 2000) 
After the analysis of causes and consequences of maritime accidents three areas were 
recognized in the domain of decision making and putting into practice that can have 
essential influence on safety and management style. They are: 
• The negative influence of the shipping company (Management) expressed 
through the dominant communication company – ship in which process the crew 
meet the interests of the company against their own beliefs and attitudes which 
are eventually lost, become passive or transform into submissive attitudes – 
Management Complacency. As a socio-psychological phenomenon Management 
Complacency occurs in conditions of inappropriate communication between 
ship’s crew and Management – shipping company. As for information exchange 
this form of communication emphasizing the dominating role of Management 
corresponds to a bad relationship between parent and child. In such relationships 
the crew feels criticized, controlled, insignificant, not given a hearing by the 
Management and with constant feeling of possible repression. This view is 
supported by the examples of not reducing the ship’s speed in order to maintain 
the ETA which were incompatible with weather and traffic conditions and in 
certain cases with technical conditions (e.g. Titanic, Estonia, Herald of Free 
Enterprise, Norwegian Dream) but which came out of the urge to please the 
Company, i.e. out of the influence of Management Complacency through the 
Master’s and Officers’ submissiveness. 
• The negative influence of leadership expressed through domination in which 
case the crew meets the requirements of the authority suppressing personal 
attitudes and beliefs – Leadership Complacency. In that sense, the Master with 
his behaviour formed eventually into attitude can unconsciously create an 
atmosphere in which the crew feels tense and uncomfortable. His relation to the 
crew can be dominant, intolerant and repressive while the crew feels criticized 
and unimportant. In such a climate the crew no longer support the Master by 
their knowledge and experience; what is more, their knowledge and experience 
are suppressed in circumstances arisen from the Master’s wrong decisions or 
omissions. Relations built in this manner can extend so far that a crewmember, 
for instance, follows the Master’s mistaken action with pleasure without 
undertaking anything at all. This can be traced in the analysis of maritime 
accidents in the majority of which the respective crew acted exclusively 
according to the Master’s decisions even on the occasions which pointed to the 
danger and the urge of taking action or measures contrary to those taken by the 
Master(ROTHBLUM 2000). The tankers Torrey Canyon, Amoco Cadiz and 
Erica are clear examples of the effect of Leadership Complacency. Another 
proof of what has been discussed above is disorganisation in case of the 
Master’s failure at the commanding and organisational levels (e.g. Oceanos) 
when the panic-stricken crew started abandoning ship due to the lack of 
information and direct commands leaving the passengers to their destiny. 
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• The negative influence of the acquired feeling of superiority and personal 
significance to the change of personal, previously positive attitudes – Self-
Induced Complacency. For example, a Chief Officer who satisfies all the 
requirements to become the ship’s Master is not promoted even after many years 
of irreproachable career while his colleagues with the same qualifications have 
already been filling such a post for some time. In that sense, there are two 
possible ways of reaction. A mature and realistic Chief Officer will carry on 
doing his best and applying his knowledge and experience in a professional way. 
A less mature and less realistic Chief Officer will start behaving contrary to 
what would be expected from his knowledge and skills and will not maximize 
his efforts as regards the safety of navigation. Such a reaction is a form of 
protest against the non-appreciation of his skills, knowledge and experience. 
Adopting such a dangerous form of behaviour he unconsciously satisfies his 
vanity and compensates his unrealised ambition in a wrong way. Such a form of 
behaviour is qualified as Self-Induced Complacency. In the analysis of maritime 
accidents it is possible to apply the notion of Self-Induced Complacency to the 
Second Officer of Admiral Akhimov that collided with Pyotr Vasev. At the time 
of the accident the Officer has already been filling the post for 25 years so that it 
is hard to believe that he was not familiar with collision regulations. 
From the above mentioned a conclusion can be reached that Complacency can lead to 
accidents with serious consequences. This phenomenon has been explained by Wiener 
from the University of Miami as follows: “Complacency can strike any person in any 
occupation, where a person feels his skill, knowledge and his experience are called into 
question by superiors. And the result will most likely be changed attitudes caused by 
gradually hampered creativity.” 
In that sense, shipping and ports are brought under common denominator related to 
the risks of occurrence of accidents caused among other things by human error arising 
partly from wrong attitudes and bad work habits due to the influence of Complacency. 
This is even more true as most port workers have previous experience on board ships 
which they spontaneously transferred to administrative and operative work in the port. It 
follows that safety in port regarding acquired attitudes and work habits shown through 




4. Complacency as influential element on port organisation and principal functions 
 
Ports, like most other commercial activities, are constantly changing. Cargo-handling 
technology and changes in labour requirements and culture have also evolved. In 
accordance with those requirements a significantly smaller but better trained workforce 
was needed. During all this changing, ports are constantly trying to maximise cargo 
throughput or minimise its cost that means maximising the profit. This is a very well 
known concept of shipping companies whose goals are to maximize the turnover of 
ships with minimum cost and maximum benefit. That is the magic circle in which, from 
the aspect of ports, many groups and interests are involved and port management and 
administration tend to become too large and complex. In these circumstances port 
management operates under great many tight constraints. All the external constraining 
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groups like shippers, ship owners, trade unions, environmentalists, local area authorities 
and national government will be putting pressure on the port management to satisfy 






Figure 1: Constraining influences on port management. 
 
Constraining influences on port management are connected mainly to far-reaching 
political decisions, either at national or at regional level. In circumstances as those 
mentioned above scenario for complacency is very wide. For example, in 1998 the 
results of an international survey covering 1000 reports from ships and terminals were 
published. The reports covered 222 terminals in 46 different countries. Most of the 
problems reported by ships and terminals were related to the breakdown of 
communication and mutual understanding. Some 30% of ship reports considered the 
terminal interface unsatisfactory and frequently there was no terminal representative on 
site with authority to accept responsibility or make decisions. A common complaint 
from ships was «loading was too fast and we had to leave with our ballast on board». 
This shows that operational level at those terminals which is responsible for tactical 
decisions was related to everyday operations and that connected to port functions such 
as shipping companies, stevedoring companies and freight – forwarders was 
unorganised and sloppy.(Applied Systems Institute., United States. Office of Port and 
Intermodal Development. et al. 1981; International Labour Office. and International 
Maritime Organization. 2004) Constraining influences on management level together 
with poor tactical decisions on operational level affect support level that is associated 
with tasks carried out by different government agencies or private enterprises. 
Analysing this report (Patric 1999)it is very easy to notice that breakdown of 
communication and mutual understanding along with absence of terminal representative 
and authority show presence of leadership complacency. Furthermore, the consequences 
of such a behaviour are visible from an analysis of oil spill accidents between 1974 and 
1990. The report indicates that over 70% of those accidents occurred in port during 
loading and discharging operations, and further 12% were from ships in port that were 
engaged in bunkering operations. This means that positive initiative of workers on 
operational level was low because in many cases they only did what their superior or 
management expected of them to do. Positive initiative means that they could do 
something against the spillage in time, but they did not because they followed the orders 
based on routine or inadequate procedures. The absence of initiative is another evidence 
of the presence of complacency based mainly on leadership. Bad communication 
between ship’s mates and terminal operator, as quoted in Lloyd's List in August 1998 
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for a large container ship loading in the Far East, indicated that around 10% of changes 
in the stowage plan were necessary, mostly in the latter stages of loading. Such last-
minute changes can cause serious problems for ship's stability, and especially Chief 
Mate, because container ships are very sensitive to any changes in top weight. So, that is 
again a case of misunderstanding between ship and terminal management because of the 
lack of communication and tendencies of the terminal to «fill up» the ship with cargo at 
any cost. This shows the presence of Management Complacency because the attitude of 
efficient loading, which means profit, was not followed by safety.  
However, there are other factors that have to be considered to understand the tensions 
between management, operational and support levels in ports, or between ship's officers 
and terminal operators that commonly lead to some kind of complacency. Mainly, that 
depends on port organisation that can be hierarchical or matrix.(United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. Secretariat. and United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development. 1985) Hierarchical or functional organization is usually 
present in ports under direct government control. It means that national government or 
regional authorities more often than not assumed a role of supreme authority to port 
authorities. The ports in which private sector participates in the ownership usually have 
matrix organizational structure. In this matter centralized decision-making is 
characteristic of ports under direct government control. Otherwise, shared decision-
making is present in ports in which private sector dominates. From this point of view it 
is easy to conclude that complacency in any form can occur much more often in ports 
with centralised government control and typical hierarchical structure, which mean 
centralized decision-making, than in ports with private sectors. This conclusion can in a 
way be supported by a statement of the Editor of Port Development International in 
1992 who wrote: «For too long the inefficiencies and excesses of the dockers have been 
mirrored by top-heavy administrations - over-manned, under-talented and equally 
obdurate to change». In general, the trend worldwide, in Europe, China, Africa, Asia, 
etc., is to decentralise direct government control and to place the port on a more 
commercial footing. This is indicated by a survey conducted by F.R. Harris in the late 
1980s in which around 80% of ports replied that private sector participation was 
increasing. For example, in 1983 ABP (Associated British ports) consisting of 19 UK 
ports was privatised with most employees owning at least 1000 shares. Since then, 
labour productivity has increased by 40%. But it would be exaggerated to conclude that 
complacency depends on the type of port ownership only. 
From the aspect of complacency, a port is not a coherent entity like a ship but a loose 
collection of trading activities within a fairly arbitrary boundary. This makes it more 
difficult to theorise about how and when complacency will cause an accident. For 
example, a subject included in the support level such as Vessel Traffic Service – VTS 
can operate as active and passive VTS. Active VTS operates in such a way that within a 
defined area the VTS traffic controller regulates the conduct of vessels in accordance 
with port or regional legislation. With passive VTS the person in charge has only the 
role of traffic advisor informing the vessels in the area of current traffic movements and 
of any unusual circumstances. Most ports have a traffic control centre operated by 
experienced and qualified mariners who are able to observe the movement of all vessels 
within the port by enhanced radar and video presentation. All these facts are supported 
by the IMO Resolution A 857- Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Service adopted in 
November 1977. In this resolution the IMO defines VTS as «traffic monitoring service 
which is implemented by a competent authority, designed to improve safety and 
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efficiency of vessel traffic and to protect the environment». This competent authority 
could be a «governmental maritime organisation, single port authority, pilot 
organisation or any combination of these». All these measures are not enough from the 
aspect of complacency. Complacency strikes from the inside and can avoid all these 
measures. It means that complacency will occur as human error from the weakness of 
the system – man in charge of VTS. As it has been written before, mariners can move 
from ship to other duties, such as VTS controller, but they retain mariner 
communication habits and way of thinking. The real question that is important for safety 
within a VTS area is which kind of organizational experience the controller has from 
previous ship service. If he served under shipping company that has reflected 
management complacency for many years, it means that this person still has the routine 
of compliance. So, how compliance resulting from complacency can cause an accident 
within a VTS area is clearly visible from the case of the tanker Exxon Valdez in 1989. 
In this case the VTS controlling Prince William Strait on the Alaska Marine Terminal 
tacitly accepted the information from the Master of Exxon Valdez that he intended to 
sail outside the separation scheme because of the presence of ice. In these circumstances 
VTS could not follow the ship movement on the radar screen. The VTS did not protest 
against the action of the Master of Exxon Valdez. It was clear evidence that VTS in this 
area suffered from management complacency because all the staff tacitly supported 
compliance to Exxon company that owned the tanker Exxon Valdez. 
Complacency can be recognized from other entities as common cause of errors in 
ports. An example is the grounding of the tanker Sea Empress on February 22, 1996. 
The UK Environmental Agency commenced criminal prosecutions against Milford 
Haven Port Authority and Milford Haven Harbour Master. The Milford Haven Port 
Authority was accused because it failed to regulate navigation within the harbour 
properly and failed to provide proper pilot service. The Harbour Master was also 
accused because he failed to take safety precautions and measures to regulate shipping 
at the entrance to and within the port. The Marine Accident Investigation Report found 
that the immediate cause was pilot error caused by inadequate training and experience. 
The real question is: “Are accidents necessary to find out a person’s inexperience and 
poor training?” Somebody had known before that this person is not experienced enough 
and that he needed more training. So, that is the problem of leadership complacency in 
the organization of Port Authority and self-induced complacency from the aspect of 
Harbour Master. The result of these forms of complacency is that in January 1999 the 
port of Milford Haven was fined 4 million pounds sterling arising out of these charges.  
If we compare accident like this one with some accidents on board ship it is possible 
to conclude that compatibility of interests among entities within port environment is 
much lower than among on board departments. Maritime accidents as an outcome of 
human error bear negative consequences to all participants (company and its 
shareholders, master, crew and environment) while misconduct of one of the entities 
operating within port limitations may be significant advantage to its competitor or even 
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5. Possible measures to prevent negative impacts of complacency in port operations 
 
As it has been mentioned earlier in this paper the problem of complacency in general 
is problem of improper communication. Traditional hierarchical relationship with 
emphasised subordination and centralized decision-making is fundamental condition for 
affirmation of any kind of complacency. Therefore, no mariner should be employed in 
port if he suffers from complacency from the very beginning The measures against this 
phenomena are content of the team work and principles of matrix organization. Shared 
decision-making based on trust and mutual understanding lead any port entity to a 
common goal and that is efficiency. That means optimum use of resources within an 
acceptable context of safety that is reasonable starting point for efficiency. So, the 
starting point would be team building inside any port entity and between entities. The 
way from the beginning of team building to mature team is not short and needs three to 
four years. During this period commercial efficiency of the port will grow slowly but 





Complacency is conceptually communication phenomenon which can evolve in any 
organization where the relationship among employees are based on domination of 
superiors and hierarchical organization. Thus, complacency starts as an unconscious 
reaction to bad communication or unpleasant environment. Behaviour is then changed 
and finally the person's attitude is completely changed. When the process is finished, the 
person falls into a state where he or she unconsciously no longer uses available 
knowledge and resources. From the aspect of port as a complex and dynamic 
organization, complacency can cause serious problems and financial loss. The main 
problem with complacency is that it starts unconsciously and the complacent employee, 
for example a VTS controller, port pilot, harbour master etc., does not realize possible 
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